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In a famous opinion, (1) rendered as early as 184C,-
Chief Justice Taneyof the United States Supreme Court,made
use of the following significant expression: "If any State
deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits in,.
jurious to its citizens,and calculated to produce idleness,
vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the ConstitUtion of
the United States to prevent it from regulating and restrain.
ing the traffic,or from prohibiting it altogether,if it
thinks prope:r." The traffic in intoxicating beverages has
assumed such gigantic proportions, is the direct cause of
so much miser , and want, and in manifold wa,s is such a
menace to the public welfare ,that Legislatures of many
States have endeavored to check or control,or to eradicate
its evils. In order to accomplish this result, the highest
power in each State has been called into exercise,and laws
have been enacted,the ostensible object of which has been
"to prevent intemperance,pauperism and crime," but which, in
many inst~nceshave virtually resulted in the prohibition
of either the manufacture,importation or sale of intoxicarits,
thus raising constitutional questions,as to whether such
legislation is properly within the Police Power of the State.
But it is necessar,, to have a clear conception of the
nature and extent of the police Eower itself before at-
tempting to determine whether a particular instance of
legislation comes within its purview. This power is
incapable of an- very exact definition or limitation, for
upon it depend the security of social order, the life
and health of the citizen, the enjoy ment of private and
social life, and the beneficial use of propert,1.
IM'. Justice Field says (1), that it is "the power of the
state to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education and good order of the people,
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develope its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity." This definition, taken with those of Judgeo
Cooley (2) and Mr. justice Blackstone (3), presents as
comprehensive an idea of the scope and operation of this
power as could well be embodied in the same number of
words. The maxium, " Salls populi suprema lex"
was early recognized as fundamental, and the power of
the State in all matters pertaining to the general wel-
fare of the people became omnipotent and co-extensive
with that absolute and unlimited legislative power, which,
within itself, ever,, sovereign State must possess. It is
said b-- JJdge Selden (I) that, "it is true tlhat, as govern.
iyentt is instituted for beneficent purposes, atid to pro-
mt-ethe welfare of the govertA41, it has no moyral right
to enact a law which is plainly rcpugnant to reason and
justice. But this principle belongs to the science of
political ethics, and not that of law. There is no ar-
biter beyond the State itself to determine what le-isla-
tion is just. The union of the functions of iaking and
deciding upon laws constitutes,of necessity, absolute
legislative power. Wh-ile, therefore, the right of a sov-
ereign State to pass arbitrary and tyrannical laws may,
its legal power cannot be denied." This being self-
evident, it is clear that in a perfectly natural and
simple distribution of governmental powers, it is not
within the power of the judiciary to pronounce void ah-r
act of the legislature. Thus it appears that the police
power is, of necessity, despotic in its character and
commensurate with the sovereignty of the State. It is
not surprising, therefore, that legislative bodies have
often disregarded the spirit of liberty and justice, and
under the guize of an exercise of this power, have sacri-
ficed both public and private rights. English monarchs,
in this manrer,so often oversteppdthe bounds of justice,
and trampledupon the liberties of their subjects, that,
to protect themselves from such tyranny, the people from
time to time have asserted, their rights, have resisted
various attempts to violate tieu, and have cor.miielled
their arbitrary rulers to grant successively The 1Jan.-n
Charta, The Bill of Rights, The Petition of Right, and
The Act of Settlement. These are royal concessions. As
such, they restrain merely the exercise of the rpyal
preroffative; they do not limit the power of the British
Parliament, but rather secure to it, the right of abso-
lute and uncontrolled legislation. "Parliament is
omnipotent". Laws intended to promote the welfare of
society are within its leg-islative discretion, and can
not be the subject of judicial animadversion. It "has, the
power to disregard fundamental principles (1) and pass
arbitrary and unjust enactments; but it cannot do this
rightfully, and it has the power to do so simply because
there is no written constitution from which its author-
ityT springs or on which it depends, and by which the
Courts can test the validit - of its declared will."
Thus, recourse to the ballot box or to rebellion are the
only remedies for unjust le',:islat ion open to the English
people. In Great Britain, Parliament is recojnized as
rightfully exercising the complete legislative authority
of the countr-y: in th2 Aerican States the absolute power
of legislation resides in the people themselves, as an or-
ganized body politic. This sovereignty of th2 people is
an underlying principle of all free goveritent,and upon it
our ancestry ordained and established rot onl,, the Consti-
tution of the several States,but also that of the United
States. In the delegation of their power,the people took
care to separate the legislative,executive and judicial
functions; and it was their evident intention that the
exercise of each should rest in a separate department.
Thus, "under our system of government,with co-ordinate
brancheseach independent within its sphere,and all deriv-
ing their power from a coimmon sourcethe fundamiental law,
one cannot exercise a supremecy! over the other,except as
it findswarrant for it in that law."
To no branch of our government has such"a supremecy"
ever been greted by the Constitution; but, instead, a
"system of check and balances" has been adopted, which
imposes certain rest'rictions upon each department, arid
under which the judiciary has acquired the power to annul
such legislative acts as are contrarynot to natural justice
and equity, but to certain express Constitutional
provisions. Although there is reason arid authority for
holding that," when a statute is contrary to t!e spirit
of the constit ition and the implicatiorns necessarily
drawn from it, or to the fundamentals of justice and
good government, or to those cardinal principle of the
social compact , which under all le, islation and enter
into the frame-work of representative government, it is
in the power of the Court to pronounce it void," never-
theless, it is now definitely settled that no court has
the right to nullify a law simply because, in its judge-
ment, it appears to be repugnrant to reason,to subvert
clearly vested rights,or to violate the first principles
of our Republican institutioni, for the courts are not
the guardians of the rights of the people, except as
those rights are secured by some constitutional provision
which comes within judicial co-nizance.
In order to secure the blessin-s of liberty to them-
selves and their posterity, the framers of the Federal
Constitution deemed it expedient to place certain re-
strictions upon the power of the State; but the ori-inal
instrument contained so few positive restraints that,
during the century of our Constitutional history, it has
become necessary, as the ex! ;encies of the times have
demanded, to make amendments which would atill further
protect our liberties. " History repeats itself; "an(." vihus,ever
i ri
mi$dful o. the ma1Ter 7:,flich their rijits arid privilages
had been abused, and fearin; the ag-ressivc tet[dency of
power, the people of the several Status have limited
their legislatures, in the exercise of what would other-
wise be, plenary power, by incorporating into their re-
spective constitutions those provisions in the nature of
bills of rights, which Chancellor Kent has so aptly
termed, " ,,art of the muniments of freenen, showing
their title to protection." But for these constit'i-
tional provisions, the police power of the State might
be exercised with most despotic severity; as it is,
they restrain that " right hand of sovereignty" in n ier-
our particulars relating to life, liberty, property, con-
tract, religion, and pursuit, and make secure the privil-
ages and imrmiwn ties of our citizens. "They are," sa ,s
.Ir. Justice Swayne (1)," a bulwark of defense, and can
never be made an engine of oppression. " To these con-
stitutional guaranties alone, is the police power of
the legislature subject. That power extends to all re,-
ulations prouiotive of the health, ood order, iorals,
peace and safetly of society, and is exercised on a great
variety of subjects, and in almost numberless va7Ts;
but under the pretense of presci'ibing a police regulation
the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon an,, of
the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution
intended to secure against abridgement. "It is the
province of the law making power to det Jrmirie whern the
exigen c y exists for calling into exercise the police
power of the State (1) , but what are the subjects of its
exercise is clearly a judicial question." :iany fla-
grant and indefensible invasions of private rights have
occurred in the Legislative history of our countr1y, arid
these have given rise to muc litigation involving Con-
stitutional questions, in the consideration of which tlho
courts substantially agree that, whenever by a reason-
able construction) the constitutional limitations can be
made to avoid an unrikhteous exercise of the police powe;r,
that construction will be upheld,notwithstanding the
strict letter of the Constitution does not prohibit the
exercise of such a power," for the Constitution, being
the result of legislation by the l-eople themselves before
parting :'rith their power is the paramount law.
The princi t statutes, the constitutional validity
of which has been questioned, maay be classed as follows:
Meat inspection laws; the tene:ient house ci'a- act;
laws prohibiting the manufacture or sale of oleomargerine;
acts requiring dr-umers to take out licences; statutes
regulating elevator and railway, charges; and prohibitory
liquor legislation.
As the Constitution is the only standard for the
courts to determine the question of statutory validity,
it should be comparatively easy for the courts to decide
xYvether a particular law is without the pale of legisla-
tive authority and therefore void; but, as even a curso-
ry examination of the caseswill reveal, there is a
great diversity in the judicial holdiigs. 71hile -cgree-
ing as to the escential principles, the tendency of the
United States Supreme Court is to declare valid all acts
which are even ostensibly police relilations and which
do not violate an express inhibition of the Constitution;
whereas, that of the State courts and especially of the
New York Court of Appeals, 4is to hold valid onl, such
as are actually police regulations, and which do not
contravene the liberal interpretation of a Consitutional
provision. This difference of opinion as to the extent
to which a State may exercise its police power, and still
not infringe upon private rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, is one of g1-ave importance, and has be..n th
subject of much discussion and nmeri articles by famous
law-ers,, philosophers, statesmen and j'i-ists. And of
all the classes before mentioned, the Prohibitor:y Liquor
Legislation has given rise to more casesinvolving Consti-
tutional questions of great moment, and frauht with in-
tense interest to the people at large, as well as to the
reformer, the politiCian,ithe legislator and the judge;
consequently, I will proceed at once to the discussion of
the constitutionality of this particular class of legis-
lation, omitting a consideration of the others, except as
the principles evolved from them are applicable to the
subject matter in hand.
Regulation vs. Prohibition.
From an early, period in civilization, in all
countries, the unrestricted traffic in intoxicants has
been regarded as pernicious. "Hence as is believed, in
the code of laws in every civilized State, it has at all
times been regulated and put under restraint. In this
respect it has formed an exception to other le'-itimate
business, and it is believed to have -es ilted from humane
feelings and a desire to suppress immorality , vice, crime
and disorder, and the othe r miseries that follow in its
train. This restraint (1), is not the peculiar growth
of any particular political faith, or an: creed or sect,
but seems to be a desire implanted in our nature to pro-
tect our race and kind from such evil; and it is implant-
ed in the police power of the State, and nay be exercised
as the law-maker shall deem for the best interest of
society." In short, it will be seen that in nothing
has the power of the government been more steadilyl and
uniformly exercised, from the beginning, than n hedging
abont, and placing guards and restrictions upon the
traffic in intoxicating liquors, to the exclusion of all
mere natural rights. The ass 3rtion of Judge Johnson,
however, (2) that "The right to restrict and regulate
includes that of prohibition," is subject to severe
criticism. It is certain that the legislature cannot
totally annihilate commerce in any species of property
and so condemn the property, itself to extinction.
It is equallt certain that the legislature can regulate
trade in property of all kinds. Neither of these pro-
positions is denied, but the, necessarily. lead to a=Atb1er,-
that between regulation and destruction (p'.olibition)ther3
1-.
is somewhere, however difficult to define with pr-ecision,
a line of separation. All reasoning, therefore,, in fa-
vor of upholding legislation which belongs to one class,
hecause it is often difficult to distinguish froi t-at
which belongs to another, must be fallacious, because
it is simply reasoning against admitted conclusions.
It is quite obvioas that the end which the legislator Liay
have in view, assiuming that to be the prevorition of the
evils of drinking, ma- be attained by direct and also by
indirect measures. " For instance, (1) prohibiting intox-
ication wo Id be one means; prohibiting drinking at all
would be another, one degree more remote; prohibiting
the sale for drinking is still more remote. So legisla-
tion may be carried farther and farther from the object
directly in view; as prohibiting the sale for any pu--
pose; prohibiting the manufacture; prohibiting even the
existence of liquor; or even of those things from which
liquors can be procured." ToW, though the general pur-
"()so is entirely legitimate and within the scope of leg-
islative authority, and though direct legislation for the
attainment of that end might be free from objection, yet,
it by no means follows that measures operating remotely,
though conducive to the end in view, may not violate the
restraints of the Constitution. And, in fact, such leg-
islation has too often weakened and impaired our consti-
tutional safeguaards. It is true, that, prior to the ra4-
ification of the Fourteenth Amendment on the 25th of July,
1868, there was nothing in the Constitution of the United
States, except "the glittering generalities" of the Pre-
amble, to prevent a State from regulating and restrict-
ing the traffic or from prohibiting it altogether,-
there was nothing by which the,constitutionalit:, of a pro-
hibitory liquor law could be tested. But in the full-
ness of their wisdom and experience, our forefathers had
provided for just such an emergency by incorporating into
the several State constitutions certain simple and compre-
hensive provisions, substantially declaring that "no
member of this State (1) shall be disfranchised or de-
prived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the i"
judgment of his peers"; and "that no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law;(2)nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." The true interpretation
of these phrases is, that where rights are acquired by
the citizen under th. existing law, tlere is no power in
any branch of the govern ment to take them away; and
thus, many measures of restraint and prohibition have been
assailed as repugnant to the State constitutions, al-
though they were enacted by State Legislatures in the ex-
ercise of the police power and in accordance with the doctrin-
es Taid down in the Licence Cases (1), and the principles
enunciated therein by the learned Chief Justice Taney,
and Justices Grier and Mc Lean. But in general, a public
sentiment against the traffic in intoxicants, which was
sufficiently strong in a State to bring about the en-
actment of prohibitory laws, has proved itself equally
powerful in repelling attempts to invalidate those laws;
so that the decisions in the cases, Yiynehamer V. The People
(2), Beebe V. The State (3), and The State V. Vfalruff (4)
stand out in sharp and shining contrast to many decisions
of other State courts, and especially to those rendered in
the United States Supreme Court in the cases of similar
import, which Uave been carried before tmat aLust body
since the adoption of Amendment XIV. The decisions
in this line of cases have depended more particulary upon
the scope and construction given by the courts to the so
called "property clauses"; and, therefore, before pro-
ceeding to the discussion of the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting either the sale, keeping, rarnufacture, or mi-
portation of ardent spirits, it will be well to devote
some space to the consideration of - whether one can have an,;
Property in Intoxicating Liquors,
and, if so, whether the right of property in them is as
extensive and inviolable as that in any other species of
property. There can be no doubt that intoxicating liquor
is property. It is a chattel,an article of use, of con-
sumption and of conmmerce, and is property irn the strict-
est legal and constitutional sense. From the earliest
ages intoxicants have been produced and consumed as a
beverage, and have constituted an articie of great im-
portance in the commerce of the world. In this country
the right of property in them was never, so far as I know,
for an instant questioned. In this state they are bough't
and sold like other property; the,: are seized and sold
on legal process for the pa7-.ient of debts; they are, like
other goods, the subject of actions of law; and when the
owner dies, their value constitutes a fund for the bene-
fit of his creditors, or goes to his children and kindred
according to law or the will of the deceased. The:- enter
lar-el,- into the foreign and internal cor-mierce of the
state, even the United States Supreme Court (1) reco-niziji;
them to be " merchantable commodities and known articles
of commerce." It ma, be said, it is true, that intoxi-
cating drinks are a spocies of propertU which performs
no beneficent part in the political, moral, oo social
economy of the world. It niay bc urged, and I will admit,
demonstrated with reasonable certainty, that the abuses
to which it is liable are so great,that the people, even
of this State, can dispense with its very existence, not
only without injury to their aggregate interests, but
with absolute benefit. But "the foundation of property
is not in plilospphie or scientific speculations, nor
even in the suggestions of benevolence oi philanthropy
It is simple and intelligible proposition, admitting in
the nature of the case of no qualification, that that
is property which the law of the land recofriizes as s..ch.
It is, in short, an institution of the law, and not a re-
sult of speculation in science, morals or economy. "
These observations, while quite elenmentar,-, lead
4irectlyT to the conclusion that all property is alike in
the characteristic of inviolability. If the Legislature
has no power to confiscate and destroy property in general.
it has no such power over any particular species. If in-
toxicating liquor is property, the Constitution does not
permit a legislative estimate to be made of its usefulness,
with a view to its destruction. In a word, that which
belongs to the citizen in the sense of property, and as
such has to him a commrercial value, cannot be pronounced
worthless or pernitiots, and so destroyed and deprived
of its essential attributes.
Having thus satisfactorily demonstrated that intox-
icating liquor is property in the most absolute and un-
qualified sense of the term, and as such is as much enti-
tled to the protection of the Constitution as land, houses
and chattles of any description, I am confronted with
that somewhat serious question,- Can the owner of intox-
icants virtually be deprived of any of those rights which
are the very essence of property and which of necessity
accompany its possession ? Now, I can form no notion of
property which does not include the essential character-
istics and attributes with which it is clothed b, the
laws of society. In the state of nature, property did
not exist at all. " Every man might then take to his use
what he pleased (1), and retain it if he had sufficient
power; but when man entered into society, arid industry,
arts and sciences were introduced, property wls gained by
various means, for the securing whereof proper laws were
ordained." iaterial objects, therefore, are proljerty- in
the true sense, because they are impressed by the laws
and Lisages of society with certain qualities, among which
are, fundamentally, the right of the occupant or the
owner to use and enjoy them exclusively, and his absolute
power to sell and dispose of them; and as property con-
sists in the artificiLU, impression of these qialities upon
material things, so whatever removes the impression de- :-
stroys the notion of property, although the thitigs them-
selves may remain physically untouched. Thus, while it
has been generally conceded that state legislatures have
the power to regulate the sale of intoxicatiig liquors,
statutes which go still further,and undertake to .holly
prohibit the manufactu-e, importation or sale of all in-
toxicating beverages, have been fiercely assailed on con-
stitutional grounds as violations of the rights of pro-
perty/; and, for the purposes of the present discussion,
the topics to be separately considered are tabulated as
follows : -
The Constitutionality of Laws Prohibiting -
I.- The Sale of Previously Acquired Liquors,
2.- The Sale of Subsequentl: Acquired Liquors,
3.- The Keeping of Liquors,
(over)
4.- The Manufacture of Liquors,
5.- The Importation of Liquors,,
The Constitutionality of laws prohibiting the
Sale of Previously Acquired Liquors.
Having established from admitted premises, that a
person can have propert, T in intoxicants, the question
which now presents itself is,- whether or riot a person
who was the owner of liquor in - State at the time such a
statute went into effect is absolutely prohibited from
selling or disposing of it. I can find no definition of
property which does not include the power of disposition
and sale as well as the right of p rivate use and enjoyment,
Thus, Blackstone says (1) , "The third absolute right of
every7 Englishman is that of property, which consists in
the free use, nnjoymernt and disposal of all his acquisi-
tions without an,- control or diminution, save only for the
laws of the land." Chancellor Kent sa-s (2), "The ex-
clusive right of using and transferring property follows
as a natural consequence from the perception and admission
of the right itself." Indeed, it is impossible to con-
ceive of property,, eliminated o2 its attributes, inca;able
of sale, and placed without the protection of the law.
The abolition of all right of sale in a State is equiva-
lent to and is a substantial deprivation of the owner of
his proper-ty. The right of sale is of the ver7T essence
of property in -n- article of merchandize; it is its
chief characteristic; take away its vendible quality,
and the article itself, though not physically, is practi-
cally destroyed, being deprived of that qualit. which
gives it its chief value, and for which its possession is
mainly desirable. A -ian m,-ay be deprived of his property:
in a chattel, therefore, without its being seized,i -:
physically destroyed, or taken from his possession.
Whatever subverts his rights in regard to it, annihilates
his property in it; and it is not pretended, nor can it
be, that property which is not per se a nuisance, can be
annihilated by the for ce of a statute alone. "Liquor is
not a nuisance per se , nor can it be made so by, a simple
legislative declaration. It does not stand (1) in the
category of conmion nuisances, which of themselves endanger
the welfare or safet, of society-. It is its use and
abuse as a beverage which gives its offensive character;
A
otherwise, it is entirel- inoffensive." That liquor is
recognized by the law as prole3"t -, that the Constitution
knows no distinction in its guaranties of the rights of
property of all kinds, and that the constitutionality of
a law is to be tested, the same as though it related to
some other and perhaps better species of property, cannot
be questioned. The Constitution surrounds liquor as
property with the same inviolability as any other species
of property; and consequently when this question was
first presented and passed upon in the famous 7T'nehamer
case, it was decided in the negative, though b. a divided
court. This leading case was brought to test the con-
stitutionality of an act (1) of the Legislature of the
State of Hew York, providing that any one selling or of-
fering to sell, o~r having in his possession with intent
to sell or give away, any intoxicating liquor, should be
fined on conviction and the liquors forfeited, unless
licensedto sell, which licence restricted the sales to
mechanical, chemical, medicinal, or sacramental purposes.
Any officer had the right to seize the liquor so illegal-
1:' offered or kept for sale, or with intent to give it
away, and arrest the offender. On conviction the liquor
.':as destroyred and the vessels containing it sold to pay
costs. The owner of the liquor, by express provisions
was debarred brdnging any suit for its conversion.
Wynehamer owned liquor at the time of the ericat!.ient of
the Statute, and when it went into force. Having sold a
portion thereof, he was indictedand convicted b, a common
law jury, in the Court of Sessions in Erie County " for
selling liquors in small quantities contrary to the'Act
for the prevention of intemperence,pauperism and crime'
passed April 0th, 1855". His conviction was affirmed
by the Supreme Court, but the Court of Appeals reversed
the judgement of the two lower courts, and held, "That the
prohibitor) act, in its operation upon property in intox-
icating liquors existing in the hands of an, person within
this state when the law took effect, is a violation of
the provision of the constitution of this State which de-
clares that no person shall be 'deprived of life, liberty
or property,without due process of law! That the various
provisions, prohibitions and penalties contained in the
act do substantially destroy the property in -uch liquors
in violation of the terms and spirit of the constitutional
provision." Though the arguments presented in the
disscting opinion of Judge T. A. Johnson, and concurred
in bY Judges 7-,-ight and M.itchell, are very valuable, and
entitled to careful consideration, yet the thorough, log-
ical, and elaborate opinions, composing the prevailin-
decision, and delivered by Chief Justice Denio and Jad!es
Comstock, Alex. S. Johnson, Hubbard, and Seldenconvince
the thoughtful student of their soundness, and evidently
met the approval of 71r. Justice Miller for in 'lartemeyer
V. Iowa (1) a dictum b- him reads thus; "The ,.iei!ht of
authority is overwhelming, that no such inmulity has
heretofore existed as would prevent state legislatures
from regulating and even prohibiting the traffic in in-
toxicating drinks, with a solitar - exception. That ex-
ception is in the case of a law operating so rigidl:y on
property in existence at the time of its passage, abso-
lutel. rohibiting its sale, as to amount to depriving the
owner of his property. "
The Constitutionality of Laws Prohibiting the
Sale tf Subsequently Acquired Liquors.
Having reached this conclusion respecting laws pro-
hibitoa-, of the sale of intoxicants previously acqui-I-d,
does it necessarily follow that laws rohibiting the sale
of subsequently acquired liquors are tuiconstitutional ?
So it would seebi ,vievredfroma purely theoretical standpoint,
but, practically., it is not so, as there is a radical dif-
ference between the two classes respecting both their
legal status as property, and the exterior influences and
agencies effecting them. As has already been intimated,
the concensus of judicial authority7 is to the effect that
it would be competent for a State legislature to pass an
act prohibiting the sale of intoxicants, provided such act
is plainly and distinctly prospective, as to the property
on which it should operate. But,by what course of reason-
ing is this position reached ? Evidently not b-- tI-.t of
John Stuart M.ill who, in his work "On Liberty"1, determines
that, " Mankind are greater gainers b . suffeuir each other
to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling
each to live as seems good to the rest"; nor by that of
William S. And .ews, when he reach es the conclusion that, (1)
"An excise law to be just should have foro its pu-Iose the
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maintenance of public order without imposing or permit-
ting any infringment upon the personal liberty of th2
citizen." The true reasons, vihen sought for, are found
else'ihere. In determining the scope of the police
power I concluded that it was confined to the imposition
of burdens and restrictions upon the righits of individuals,
in order to prevent injury to others; or in other words,
that it consisted in the application of measures for the
enforcement of the legal maxi~um, fl"Sic utere tuo,ut aliD-
nurn non laedas. 1  The objectsof the police power are
the prevention of crime, and the protection of rights
against the assault of others; and consequently) it
cannot be brought into operation for the purpose of exact-
ing pbedience to the rules of morality/, and banishing
vice and sin from the world. It is ,niversally admitted
that no trade can be subjected to police regidlations of
an- kind, unless its prosecution involves some harm or
injury to the pblic at lagte, or to third persons (1);
and in ever-, case the regulations camnot extend beyond the
evil that is so restrained. However, while it is true
that vice, as vice, can never be the subject of police
regulations, no man can claim the i-ght to ,fake a trade
of vice. A business which panders to vice, wlich has for
its object or necessary consequence the provision of
means for the indulgence of a vicious propensity or desire,
may, and always should be strenuously prohibited; and it
is upon this ground that legislation absolutely prohib-
iting the sale of intoxicating liquor as a beverage, is
mainly/ upheld as a proper exercise of the police power.
There are many prominent legal writers and jurists who are
opposed to all "such su-mptuary legislation", prominent
among whom are Mr. William S. Andrews of New York City,
and Judge Perkins, of Indiana. To quote from the I'-.
former (1); "The mere act of selling intoxicants
does no harm. The evil or injury results from their use,
or, more strictly, their misuse. It is necessarythere-
fore, only to reach and control those who misuse them to the
injury and detriment of others." And the latter"to
satisfy his judgement arid conscience" declared a prohib-
itoiy law of Indiana unconstitutional, holding that, (2)
"The court knows as a matter of general knowledge and is
capable of judicially asserting the fadt that the use of
beer etc. as a beverage, is not necessarily hurtful, any
more than the use of lemonade or icecream. It is the
abuse, and not the use of all these beverages that is
hurtful. But the legislature enacted the law in
question upon the assumption that the manufacture and
sale of beer were necessarily destructive to the Cormnu-
nity; and in acting upon that assumption, it has invad-
ed unwarrantably the right of private propert,, and its use as
a. bevbrage andan article of traffic." The position of
these gentlemen is clearly erroneous in the light of the
previous disussion of this topic; and, in fact, the
decision of Judge Perkins has since been overrulled so
that at present the courts of Indiana agree with the ma-
jority of our states and federal courts in sustaining as
constitutional all prohibitory liquor legislation which
is plainly prospective in its operation.
2,
The Constitutionality of Liaws Prohibiting
the Keeping of Intoxicants.
Besidos the question hefeinbefore discussed, the
WYVnehamer case raised another as to wheth-er the Ist
section of the act, the constitutionalit- of which was
assailed, taken in connection with 4th section, could be
reconciled with arny just views of legislative power.
That section declared in substance, that intoxicating
liquors, except as thereinafter provided, should neitheY'
be sold, or kept for sale or with intent to be sold in any
place whatsoever; or be given away, or kept with intent to
be given away, anywhere but in a private dwelling-ho use.
These provisions, although they abrogated the right of
sale, did not prohibit the liquors from being kept, pro-
vided no design was entertained of selling them; nor did
they prohibit thei-0 being used by the owner.. So far the
section ma7,r not have conflicted with the constitution.
But, it proceeded (1), "nor shall it be kept or deposited
in any place whatsoever, except in such dyelling-houses
as above described, or a church or place of worship, for
sacramental purposed,or in a place where either some chem-
ical or mechanical, or medicinal art, requiring the use of
liquor, is carried on as a regular branch of business."
This last clause was an absolute prohibition against the
keeping of liquors anywhere but in the excepted pl~ces
although the owner mar have had no intention to use, sell
or give them away; and the 4thsection declared a vio-
lation of this clause to be a ri;isde,-u1ioo. These cer-
tainl-Y are most extraordinary provisions, having the
effect to render a person a criminal who was so unfort-
unate as to have a quantit, of liquor on hand in a for-
bidden place at the time the law took effect, although he
had no intent to violate the law by selling. A person
thus circumstanced -vould have but one of two alternatives
to avoid criminality, either just before the law took
effect to remove the liquor to a dwellin;-hcuse, a ch-,irch,
or a shop for mechanical or other prescribed uses, or to
destroy, it with his own hand. The idea of depositing all
the liquor on hand vhLen, the law took effect, in these
execpted places, is plainly illusory,. A suggestion (1)
that the owners might save their propert: by exportation
is equally so, for no State court can know judicially
that any article, the sale of which is prohibited, and
which is declared a nuisance in that State, would be ad-
mitted is an article of merchandize into another.
Under such a law "property is lost before-c the police are
in motion," and, I may add, crime is comm~itted without
an act or even an intention. In addition to these pro-
hibitions, liquor kept contrary to them was dclared to
be a nuisance, and for an injur.- to it or the taking it
away from the owner, he could maintain no action, unless
he proved that it was (I ) "lawfully kept and owned by
him;" and as this lawfulness was made to depend in all
cases upon the non-existance of an intent to sell, 4nd in
some cases,of an intent to give it away, the nearly impos-
sible burden of making out those negatives was throvn
upon the owners. In my judg;enment this was not a scheme
of regulation but a legal distruction of property, coming
little short of a law authorizing an officer, or any one,
directly to destroy the liquor. There is a distinction
between a prohibition against the acquisition, possession,
or keeping of property and the imposition of burdens
upon the property itself, or restrictions upon the use
thereof; or between the total destruction of the rightto
acquire and possess property, and the regulation thereof
in such a manner as to prevont injury either to individ-
uals or public rightsand promote the public welfare.
The former, the legislature is prohibited b,, the consti-
tution from doing;the latter that department is not -
restrained from acting upon "according to its free will and
sovereign pleasure." AnaJlagous to the class of legislatihn
under condideration, are those portions of certain pro-
hibitory" laws directing an officer, after destro-ing the
intoxicants, either to sell the vessels containing it
to pay costs, ( Laws of Newy York 1855 p. 340), or to
destroy. all'sigis; screens, bars, bottles, glasses, and
other property used in keeping arid maintaining the nui-
sance." (Laws of Kansas 1885 ). Concerning such provi-
sions Mr. Justice Fields says, (Mugler V. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, at p. 678 ) "I carmot see how the protection of the
morals of the people can require the destruction of pro-
perty like bottles, glasses, and other utensils, which
may be used for many lawful purposes. 'It has heretofore
been supposed to be an established principle, that where
there is a power to abate a nisance, the abatement must be
limited b'. its necessity, and no wanton or unnecessar-7
injury can be committed to the property or rights of in-
dividuals. Thus, if the nuisance consists in the use to
which a- building is put, the remedy is to stop such use,
not to tear down or to demolish the building itself, or to
destroy property fend within it." To me, at.least, it
is clear, that, in enacting such a law, a State legislature
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passes beyond the verge of constitutional authority, and
crosses the line which separates regulation from confisca-
tion.
And now as to the ric-ht of a State to enact
Laws Prohibiting the Manufacture of Liquor
within its own territory. There is no easier or more
tempting opportunity fo i the exercise of tyranny than in
the police control of occupations. The zeal of the re-
former, as well as cupidity or self-interest, must alike
be guarded against, as both are apt to prompt the emplQpJ-
ment of unconstitutional means to obtain the end desired.
That manufactures maw per so be the subject of regulation
(1), no one denies. But the reason for such regulation,
wherever it has been attempted, is obvious. There may be
incident to the process, noxious smells, and generation
of poisonous gases, as in the case of rendering and fer-
talizing establishments. There may be danger of fire
or explosion, as in the manufacture of burning liquids
or explosive powders. In all these cases the provisions
of the law are adapted to reducing the peculiar perils of
the trade to a minimum. But in order to prohibit the
prosedution of a trade altogether, the injury to the public
which furnishes the justification for such a law, must
proceed from the inherent character of the business,
so that the trade, however conducted, and %'iatever mavr be
the character of the person engag!,ed in it, mList necessari-
ly produce injury upon the public or upon some individaal
third person. It is not enough that the thing may become
harmnful, when put to a wrong use. It must be in itself
harmful, and incapable of a harmless use. Now, it cannot
be contended that there is anything in the manufacturing
of intoxicating liquors which endangers the lives or
property of others, whatever may be the injurious results
of.its intemperate use, or whatever may be the differ-
once of opinion as to its sanitary qualities; and, there-
fore, I shall endeavor in this thesis to establish that,
as this occupation is in itselfineither immoral nor noxious
to health or safety, it is not in the power of the legis-
lature either *o put it out of the way- or to destroy it. As
I am aware that this position is opposed to the over-
whelming weight of authority, I shall attempt to present
only such arguments as will substantiate my position,
trusting that they will be of sufficient weight in and
of themselves to answer all (obeo4eis) arguments to
the contrary. The present condition of the law is due,
to a line decisions in the U. S. Sup. Ct., by which a
power has been judicially granted to the States,which
no State legislature would ever have dared constitutional-
y to assume. I refer to the exaferation of the police
power, and the withdrawal of judicial protection from
those who have been wronged by its in VowelJ.
v.2..Pern. (1), it was held that the court could riot de-
clare a law prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargerine
mconstitutional and void, as "the judiciary cannot
interfere without usurping the powers committed to the
legislative department. But the case of Mugler V. Kansas
(2), is more in point 'as it held thai "If in the judgement
of the legislature, the manufacture of intoxicating
liquor, even for the makeA own use, as a beverage, would
tend to cri.plq, if it did not defeat the effort to guard
the community against the evils attending the excessive
use of such liquors, it is not for the courts, upon
their views as to what is best and safest for the commu-
nit'7 to disregard the legislative determination."
The claim that any legislative body in this country can
absolutely destroy private rights and personal liberty,
as held in these cases, is a monstrous assumption, at-Var
with the established and axiomatic principles of free
government. There is no such thing as arbitrary power
in our system of government. Every function possessed
by the State was conferred by the people, to be exercised
in their interest and for their welfare, and it is limited
in its scope by the necessity for its exercise. iever-
theles4, with these cases and others from the same source
as authorities, the courts of twenty-one States have
sustained as constitutional laws prohibiting the mranu-
fature of intoxicants. All these courts and all reason-
able men agree that the evils flowing from intoxicating
liquo-r arise wholly from its use as a beverage. As the
prohibitor,, laws attempt, not directly to' inhibit that
use, but indirectly by inhibiting the sale for such use,
it ms be said that it is the sale alone which such laws
have in viev . From that all the aplprehended evils flow,
and it has already been shown that the sale of intoxicants
may be prohibited by laws prospective in their operation.
The sole reason that is urged for imposing any restric-
tions upon the manufacture of intoxicants, is, that all
manufacture is for the purpose of sale and-carries With it
the right of sale, arid, therefore, a limitation should
be imposed upon it correspondent with that upon the sale.
I fail to see how the argument applies in this case.
The proximate cause of the evil of intemperance is its
sale as a beverage, and, because that is the subject to
police supervision and may be prohibited, it does riot
necessarilr fellow that the manufacture may be subjected
to the same burdens. Police regulations of the sale of
intoxicants should, and usually do, receive in a reason-
abl, health commnuiit, the enthusiastic support of the
entire popuilation. If this is true, it is unnecessa-'
and unreasonable for a legislative body, under cover of
the police power, to strike down anothei.- occupation which
is in no way detrimental to the safety-, the health, or
the morals of the public.
In most of the prohibitor, liquor legislation,
attempts are made to lessen its rigo[s by permittinC the
manufacture for prescribed purposes; for instance, in
the Cci,.st. of Kansas it is provided that," The manufacture
of intoxicating liquors shall be forever prohibited in
this State, except for medicinal, scientific and mechanic-
al purposes, "and to these t-he Codeof Iowa adds, "ctlina-
±. and sacramental purposes." To uphold such provisions
the U. S. Sup. Ct. has held that " a State in the exer-
cise of its undisputed power of local administration, can
enact a statute prohibiting tithin its limits the manu-
facture of intoxicants, except for certain purposes."
Of those i no advocate sich legislation, I ask, what has
the owner's state of mind in relation to his goods, in the
process of manufacture, to do with the lawfulness or
unlawfullness of that manufacture ? His intent in ever:,
case is, primarily? , to sell, whether for subsequent
exportation or use in either mechanical, medicinal,
scientific, culinary or sacramental purposes it makes no
difference. The power to limit the sale of the rmianu-
factured liquor to these purposes undoubtedly resides in
the legislature, but a measure prohibitin the man'1-
facture, except for these purposes, tho igh, perhaps,
conducive to the end in view, operates too remotely, and
being v-ithout the pale of legislative authority, violates
the restraints of the constitution.
But before leaving this topic, it seems proper to
consider the question raised in .Iugler V. Kansas as to
w'hether l e-islation prohibiting the mar lifacture within
the state of intoxicanzts, may be enforced aginst the
persons who at the time happen to own property whose
chief value consists in its fitness for such manufactaring
purpose, without compensating them for the diminution
in its value resulting from such prohibitor enactments.
Looking at this question in the light of those U. S. Sup.
Ct. decisions which grant unlimited police power to the
State Legislatures, so that an> manufacture may, be declarc1d
unlawful and prohibited as a nuisance, it necessarily
follows that "a prohibition simply upon the use of proper-
tY for purposes that are declared, b-r valid (?) legisla-
tion, to be injurious to the comnity, cannot, in an-,
just sense be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit, as the p.irciples which
govern this case, do not involve the power of eminent
domain , in the exercise of which, property i.ay not be
taken for public use without compensation. Such was the
holding in .ugler V. Kansas, which was in fact, a neces-
sary conclusion as the Sup. Ct. of the U. S. cannot
reverse the judgement of the highest coaurt of a state
because of its supi~os2d conflict with the State Constitu-
tion. it, to follow the line of argument hereinbefore
laid out, and approved by Mir. Justice Piield, in a sep-
arate opinion to 1iugler V. Kansas, I respectfully
insist that such prohibitory statutes exceed the bounds
of any proper exercise of the police power in condeming
buildings and machinery to confiscation and destruction
as comion nuisances; and that they go beyond the utmost
verge of constitutional power in abridging the rightful
privilegls and immrnsities of citizens. This position is
sustained by, Mr. Justice Brewer in an elaborate opinion
(1) which holds that the Convt. and laws of Kansas,
above referred to, have the effect; first, to,debar q
person from the use of his property for the sake of the
lublic, and to take property for the public purposes;
second, that natural equity, as well as constitutional
guaranty, Vorbids such a taking of private property for
the public- good without compensation; third, if it is
the plain puv'pose and inevitable result of such legislative
enactments or prescribed forms of proceedure, judicial or
otherwise, to despoil private property' for the benefit
of the public without compensation, it is not due pro-
cess of law. "
:1.
The Constitutionality of Laws- Imposing Restrictions
upon Inter-State Commerce in Intoxicants.
The relation of the police power of the States to
the commerce power of the nation, constitutes a subject
at once familiar and obscure; familiar in its general
characteristics, and obscure where the border lines of
the two jurisdictions touch each other. To elucidate the
obscurities of the subject and show how apparent or real
antagonisms ma- be reconciled, is too difficult a task
to undertake on this occasion, so this discussion is
confined to the right of a State, in carrying out its
policy of prohibition, to impose restraints upon Com-
merce, and thus to bring itself into conflict with that
clause of the U. S. Constitution which provides that
"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States." In con-
str,- n, this provision, a majority of the Justices of
the U. S. Si.p. Court, in the License Cases (1), held that
the States had authority to legislate -Lonsubjects of
inter-state commerce until Congress had acted upon them;
and that, as Congress had not acted, the regulation of
the States was valid. The doctrine thus declared, has
been modified since by repeated decisions, so that it is
now firml' established (1) that, "when the subject is
national in its character, and admits and requires uni-
formity of legislation, affecting alike all the States,
such as transportation between the States, including the
importation of goods from one State into another, Congress
alone can act upon it and provide the needed regulations.
The absence of any law of Congress on the subject, is
equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter
shall be free." Thus, the absence of regulations as to
inter-state commerce with reference to any particular
subject is taken as a declaration that the importation of
that article shall be unrestricted. On th ese grounds
it was decided in Bowman V. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (2)
that, "A State cannot, for the purpose of protecting, its
people a:-ainst the evil of intemperance, enact laws which
regulate commerce between its people and those of other
States of the Union, unless the consent of Congress,
express or implied, is first obtained."
Indirectly involved in that case was the question
as to whether the right of transportation of an article
of commerce from one State to another includes, by nec-
essary implication, the right of the consignee to sell it
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in unbroken packages at the place vhere the transporta-
tion terminates.
The discussion of that question gave rise to the
I'
so called "Original Package Cases,(I) in w,,hich it was
judiciall> determined; first, that intoxicating liquor
is "the subject of exchange, barter, and traffic, like
any other commodity in which a right of traffic exists,
arid are so recognized by the usages of the coranercial
world, the laws of Congress and the decisions of the
Courts; second, that, "to assert that under the Consti-
tution of the United States, the iphportation of an arti-
cle.of connerce cannot be prohibited by the States, and
yet to hold that when imported, its use and sale can be
prohibited, is to declare that the right which the Con-
stitution gives is a barren one, and to be denied so far
as anry benefits from such transportation are sought;"
third, that, the right of impartation carries with it the
right to sell the article imported, as the framers of the
Constitution never intended that a right given should not
be so freely enjoyed; and fourth, that, therefore, "it is
onl-y after importaton is completed, and the property im-
ported has mingled with and become a part of the general
property of the State, that police regulations can act
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upon it, except so far as mnay be necessary to insure
safety in the disposition Of the import thus min-led. "
In view of th-e decisions in Mugler V. Kansas and
the
Kidd 7T. Pierson, it seems strange that AU. S. Sup. Court
did not hol4, in the original package cases, that "intox-
icants constitute an exception to the general rule, and
are by reason of their dangerous character, subject to
State regulation." Such a decision would have violated
no principle of Constitutional law as theretofore assert-
ed in that court; but it may prove better for the
American people, in the end, that a majority of the court
held that it is the duty of Congress to make such regula-
tions of inter-state comerce in iritoxiaarits, as the gen-
eral welfare may require. For, though the immediate
result of the decisions,in Bowman V. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.(l)
and Leis,, V. Hardin (2), was to flood the "pi-ohibition
States" with intoxicating liquors imported and sold in
"original packages", they served to incite the temperance
prople of the nation to prompt action which resilted in
the 1{assage by Congress, on Aug. 8, 1890, of the "Yeilson
Bill" which provides that intoxicating liquors, when
shipped from one State to another, shall, upon arrival,
be subject to the opei-ation and effects of the laws of
45.
such state. The constituality of this bill has been
vigorously contested, but it has been held by the U. S.
Circuit Court in Iowa, (1) and in Arkarisas,(2) that this
act is constitutional, that it subjects such impo±'ted
intoxicants to the operation of prohibitory laws in force
before the original package decisions, and that it is
not an attempt to deldgate the power to regulate inter-
state comnerce, as it merely fixes the time when the
articles in question shall be deemed a part of the com-
mon mass of property in the State, and subject to the
exercise of the police power.
46.
Conclusion.
Upon principles Coo itnt vith the genius of our
free institutions and the constitutional guaranties of
rights, it na,, be fairly deduced that the test of all
police regulations affecting proprietary: rights is,-
whether the, are enacted in the real interests of the
public. In judging whether or not a statute meets this
requirement, the courts have a wide field of inquiry.
They ma, determine whether the provisions of the act
are such as to be essential to the public good, or only
impose harRassing burdens upon individuals; wiIether the
statute, on pretense of serving the public, diminishes
the property of one man to augment that of another; and
whether the subject of regulation includes things in
which -the public have no interest, or rights in no waw
antagonistid to the general good.
In applying these principles to the exercise of
the police power of the State over the traffic in intoxi-
cants, it has already been shown that, as pauperism, vice,
and crime are the usual concomitants of the unrestricted
indulgence of the appetite for strong drink, it is clearl-
constitutional for the State to.prohibit the sale of
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spiritous and intoxicating liquors, especially, in drink-
ing saloons; but it has also been shown that the enact-
ment of laws prohibiting the sale of previously acquired
liquors is an unconstitutional exercise of the police
power, as that power, in such a case (1), becomes "the
upper of two mill-stones which are crushing the rights
of property into powder."
Any government which deprives its citizens of the
right to engage in any lawful pursuit, subject only to
any reasonable restriction, is tyrannical and unrepub-
lican; And, therefore, I have endeavored to show that,-
when a brewer or distiller carn have his establishment
shut up by an amendment of a State constitution or an act
of a State legislature, making what was previously a
lawful employment criminal, turning what was previously
a lawful commodity of trade into "poison" in a legal
sense, and depriving his propertyT of its chief value,
for the supposed purpose of promoting the public good,
without paying him an ything for it, -then the maxium,
"Salus populi suprema lex", becomes (2), "a sort of com-
mon-law Juggernaut, beneath the weels of which the indi-
vidiual is ground to death for the benefit of the rest,
who stand around and clap their hands."
£ ~J.
Anii in the consideration of the "orijin- _! package
cases", it has beenim desire to show,- first, that it is
the duty of Con,;css (1), to keep informed of the ire-
sults of experience in matters of conmnerce, and to enact,
from time to time, all such regulations, restrictions and
prohibitions as may appear to be necessarl,  or expedient,
to protect the people against the abuses of the priveleges
of inter-state traffic, especiall- in cases on the border
line between State and National authority; and second,
that it is the duty of the State legislatures to exer-
cise the police power freely within their respective ju-
risdictions, b7 the enactment of suit.',ble laws for the
protection of public interests and p-ivatc rights, con-
forming such laws, with scrupulous carg to the yuiding
principles declared b:- the courts, and to the reg-lations
enacted by Congress.
Finis.
4I. 
Authorities.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.
Tiedman's Limitations on the Police Power.
Ex. Gov. Hoadly, in Soc.Sci. Journal, Feb., 1300.
"'Inehamer V. People, 13 N.Y., 373.
Beebe V. State, 6 Ind., 501.
State V. Walruff, 22 Cent. L. J., 277.
The License Cases, 5 How., (U.S.), p. 501.
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S ), 123.
Bartemeyer- V. Iowa 13 Wall., (U. S.), 129.
Barbier V. ConnollT, 113 U. S., 31.
Mugler V. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.
Bowman V. C.& N. Y'. h-. Co.,125 U.S., 465.
Powell V. Penn., 127 U. S., 672.
Kidd V. Pierson, 128 U. S., 1.
Leisy V. Ha'-d'in, 135 U. S., 100.
In re Spickler, 43 Fed. Rep., 623.
In re Van Vleit, 43 Fed. Rep' 701.
50.
Reference Index.
Page 1;
2;
2;
H 3;
" 4;
" 7.;
it 8 ;
"t 11;
" 11;
" 12;
i 13;
H 13;
14;
" 14;
"' 14;
" I
" 17;
"I ;
" 19;
ref. (W-
(1)-
it (2)-
if (3)-
It (1)-
(1)-
(1)-
H (1)-
WI-(2)-
(2)-
(1)-
(2)-
1? (4)-
tI (1)-
(1)-
" (1)-
H (2)-
- -License Cases, 5 Hlow. (U. S. ) 504,
- -Barbier V. Connolly,113 U.S., 1.
- -Cooley's Court Limitations. ,572
- -4,l..Com., 162
- -Tvnehamer V. People, 13 1,. Y. 378.
- -Cooley's Cons-t. Liri.. 4th Ed., p.212
- -Slaughter House Cases 1,1Uall.,128.
- -Schwuchow V. Chicago, 63 IlI.,444.
- -Bertholf V. O'Reilly, 74 IL .Y. 3772.
- -Wynehamer V. People, 13 N. Y. 373.
It It If ! If I t Hi
-- Const. of 1. Y., Art. I, Sec. I.
It 1! 11 It it it 11 6 .
-License Cases, Stat. 5 Howard 504.
- -Wynehamer V. People 13 H. Y., 373.
-Beebe V. State, 6 Ind. 501.
- -State V. V'allruff 22 C. L. J., 277.
- -Bowman V. C. &. 11. W. Ry.Co. lb35,U.S.,465
- -2 Dl. Com. 34
- -1 B1. Com., 138
- _- Kent's Com., 320.
51.
Page 20;
23;
24 ;
25;
26;
26;
i 28;
29;
30;
it 33;
it 35;
" 35;
39;
41;
II 42;
42;
43;
44 ;
44;
ii 45;
45;
47;
it (1)-
it (1)-
"I (I)-
"i (1)-
" (2)-
(1)
if (I)-
"f (1)-
" (1)-
"f (1)]-
,, (2)-
"f (1)-
"f (1)-
"' (1)-
"f (2)-
,, (1)-
" (J)-
"I (2)-
" (i)-
,, (2)-
-- Wyrnehamer V. People, 13, IT.Y. , 37'.
-- Laws of II. Y. , 1255, p. 340.
-- Bartemeyer V. Iowa, 18 Vall., 129.
-- N. Amer. Rev. Ap'., 1211
-- Austin V. State, 10 Mo., 591.
- -N. Amer. Rev., Apu., 1391.
- -Beebe V. State, 6 Ind., 501.
- -Laws of I. Y., 1855, p., 340.
- -Wyrnehamer V. People, 13 N. Y. , 373.
"If " 13 I. Y., 373.
- -Kidd V. Pierson, 12A U. S. I.
-- Powell V. Penn., 127, U. s,. 673.
- lugler V. Kansas, 123, U. .S.,23.
- -State V. Walruff, 22 Cent. L. J.,277
- -The License Cases 5 How., 504.
- -Mu. er V. Kansas, 123, U. S., 623
-- Bowman V.C. &. H. W. Ry. Co. ,125,IU.S.,405
- -Leisy V. Hardin, 135 U. S., 100
- -Bowman V.C.& 'T.VT. RP *Co.125,U.S.,465
- -Leisy V. Hardin, 135 U. S., 100
-- In re Spickler, 43 Fed. Rep. 653.
- -In re Van Vliet, 43 Fed. Rep. 761.
" (W)- - -Ex. Gov. Hoadly in Soc. Sci.J.Feb. '90
52.
Page 47; Ref.(2). - -24 Amer. Law Rev., 315.
It 4o; ,, (1)- - -25 Amer. Law Rev., Is.
